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Proving whether animals are either capable or incapable of feeling (i.e. core con-
sciousness) is a problem that is difficult to address because mental states cannot be di-
rectly observed.  Many animals exhibit behavior similar to our own, and consequently it 
is easy to attribute to them corresponding mental states.  The assumptions underlying 
these attributions, however, are subject to error; there is no absolute rule by which mental 
states correlate with behavior, and we have no means of verification through verbal re-
ports.  A different approach must therefore be taken.  Revealing the presence in animals 
of the neural structures responsible for producing core consciousness in humans would 
essentially prove that such animals too are capable of feeling.  Unfortunately, at present 
little is known about the biology responsible for producing core consciousness in hu-
mans.  At best general regions containing the necessary structures are slowly being lo-
cated.  Based upon similarity of structures, evidence suggests that at least mammals are 
core conscious and perhaps all other vertebrates as well.
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Chapter 1:  Introduction
This thesis approaches the problem of animal feelings from a neurobiological per-
spective.  Specifically, are animals capable of a basic feeling state?  Ignoring the 
content of feelings entirely, this thesis begins by analyzing what assumptions are 
made when making broad statements about animal mental states.  Chapters two 
and three then clearly define a practical use of the word “feeling,” and with this 
definition describe what is known about the requisite biology in humans.  Finally, 
given this information the fourth chapter discusses what inferences regarding the 
minds of animals we can reliably make, and outlines some broader implications 
these conclusions might have.
! The relationship that humans have with animals is a subject of great cul-
tural and individual importance (Diamond, 1997).  Throughout history, humans 
and animals around the world have been in close contact.  We know innately both 
the role of hunter and hunted.  We have domesticated species for various reasons- 
as sources of food, labor, transportation, protection, communication, and for com-
panionship.  The development of society has depended upon these interactions 
(Diamond, 1997) .  It is not surprising then, that animals are a very important part 
of our culture, present in our daily lives and represented in everything from relig-
ion to books, sports, art, and television. 
! Our relationships with animals are not always merely practical and func-
tional, such as when we use them for food or labor, but can also be emotional.  It 
is easy to develop close, loving bonds with animals especially pets that in many 
ways are identical to those we have with other humans.   To a great extent, these 
relationships rely upon assumptions that animals experience feelings that corre-
spond to those we feel.  When a dog wags its tail and jumps to greet its owner, it 
is assumed that it is experiencing a feeling of happiness and excitement similar to 
what we feel when experiencing a happy reunion.  Furthermore, when a kitten 
dies, we assume its mother is sad and mourns its loss, because this is what we 
would feel in its place.  We do not imagine that animals are as intelligent, crea-
tive, or clever as humans.  After all, they cannot solve complex math problems, 
use verbal language or create art as we can.  However, most people do (unthink-
ingly perhaps) presume that animals experience feelings just as we do.
From a scientific perspective, the study of feelings, even in humans, has 
been neglected for most of the 20th century due in large part to the prevalence of 
behaviorism.  This movement began first in 1912 through the influence of psy-
chologist John B. Watson.  He claimed that because the internal subjective states 
of a mind are inherently private and unknowable, they cannot be empirically 
measured and should therefore not be the focus of scientific study (Hauser, 2006).  
He thought that studying subjective experiential states could provide no unique 
insights into the behavior of an organism (Panksepp, 2005).   
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Instead, Watson claimed that science should "take as a starting point, first 
the observable fact that organisms, man and animal alike, do adjust themselves to 
their environment" and "secondly, that certain stimuli lead the organisms to make 
responses" (Watson, 1912).   The principles of behaviorism were founded upon 
Pavlov's famous studies of classical conditioning (Hauser, 2006).  According to 
this view, behavior can be described simply in terms of a stimulus from the envi-
ronment and the corresponding response of the organism.  An animal can be con-
ditioned to respond to otherwise independent phenomena.  In Pavlov's studies, 
dogs were repeatedly fed only after hearing a bell, and were thereby conditioned 
to respond to the bell sound with anticipation of food, namely by salivating.  To 
Pavlov and the later behaviorists, behavior is both predictable and readily manipu-
lated (Hauser, 2006).   From a behaviorist viewpoint, an animal does not think and 
certainly does not feel; it merely responds.  Studying behavior in terms of the 
laws of classical conditioning appealed greatly to behaviorists because recording 
public and observable events, not private internal ones, allowed psychology to 
become entirely an empirical and measurable process.  
By the mid 20th century, behaviorism was largely abandoned with respect 
to human psychology (de Waal, 2004).  This shift occurred principally because 
humans clearly do have subjective experiences and mental lives, and these are 
important to consider when seeking to understand our behavior (de Waal, 2004).   
For scientific studies of animal behavior, however, the rules and principals of be-
haviorism have remained strongly influential (Panksepp, 2005). Scientists still 
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tend to interpret animal behavior according to behaviorist laws of stimulus and 
response.  A rat is dehydrated, and so seeks water.  This rat is not thirsty, however, 
even though it may exhibit behaviors that remind us of a thirsty state in humans.  
To claim that it is thirsty is anthropomorphism, the projection of human-like 
qualities to non-human things.  The use of anthropomorphism in this manner is 
not scientific, and has long been considered taboo (de Waal, 2001).  It is easier 
and safer to assume that an animal is simply reacting appropriately to its envi-
ronment then to infer any internal mental state.  And from a behaviorist view-
point, what good does it do; what new knowledge can be gained by such infer-
ences?
! Such hard-nosed thinking can be troublesome for those who closely exam-
ine animal behavior.  It is difficult to fathom that animals are really mindless crea-
tures that simply respond predictably to stimuli.   Does a dog actually not enjoy 
being scratched on its belly?  Is it the dog organism merely reacting according to 
laws of conditioning?  Are all animals other than humans no different than bio-
logical machines?  How can such a theory adequately describe the incredible di-
versity of behavior found in animals or the continuum we usually see across evo-
lutionary trees when looking at a given trait?  What makes human brains so dif-
ferent from all others as to be entitled the possession of consciousness, feeling, 
and thought?  Is it really more parsimonious to assume that even though animals 
and humans share so many behaviors, only humans are in possession of corre-
sponding internal mental states?
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! There is considerable opposition among scientists and philosophers to the 
behaviorist notion of a mindless animal.  Much literature exists citing evidence of 
complex behavior that claims to prove that animals must feel and be conscious in 
a way similar to humans (Panksepp, 2005).  Most of this evidence, however, is 
purely anecdotal; recounted stories of wild animals acting compassionately to-
wards people, of elephants mourning their fallen offspring, or of birds having fun 
playing.  Such evidence is not scientific; it cannot be repeated, tested and verified, 
and it relies upon the necessarily subjective observations of highly impressionable 
viewers.
! In Theodore Xenophon Barber's book, The Human Nature of Birds, he out-
lines a great body of anecdotal evidence detailing why he believes not only that 
birds can feel, but that they possess a degree of intellectual sophistication that in 
many ways exceeds that of humans.  In one story about a sociable jackdaw, Bar-
ber describes the bird in highly anthropomorphic terms "When the Leeks tried to 
lock him in a cage for the first time, he expressed his anger very clearly, and they 
never considered it again.  It was also obvious when he was frustrated or upset; he 
might, for instance, tear a newspaper to shreds.  By his expressions and body lan-
guage the family could see how he felt and could anticipate what he was going to 
do" (p. 76).  
! If the bird did indeed act as described, it would be easy and tempting to 
see its behavior in this manner, using words that reveal its mental state (i.e. anger, 
frustrated).    This language paints a vivid picture of the bird's behavior that is in-
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tuitively understood.  As Franz De Waal points out, using anthropomorphic lan-
guage is often a very useful tool that allows for a more precise and accurate de-
scription of behavior than a straightforward, non-metaphoric one (de Waal, 2001).  
Saying that the bird was angry conveys more information than explaining that it 
was moving in a jerky, energetic manner, often pecking at one's skin, etc.  Alone, 
these descriptive words do little to clarify the animals' behavior.  Don't birds al-
ways move like that?  How would its movement be described when it wasn't an-
gry?  Making subtle distinctions about complex behaviors can quickly become a 
difficult task.  The words angry and frustrated imply all of those actions, and 
make them more cohesive by providing meaning and direction.
Though anthropomorphic language can be useful for describing behavior, 
it is risky because it also assumes that when the bird is acting angry that it is also 
feeling angry.  Such conclusions can be misleading.  What evidence is there that it 
is actually angry?  Might it instead be experiencing something more like excite-
ment?  There are certainly other equally valid interpretations.  In fact, the anec-
dote alone provides no evidence that would counter the logic of a behaviorist.  
Barber suggested that the family could predict the bird's behavior by watching its 
body language, a notion that actually complements the behaviorist concept that 
behavior can be predicted and manipulated.   The bird could just as easily be feel-
ing nothing at all as it could be feeling angry.  
Interpreting mental states in others is difficult due to several fundamental 
problems.  One is that most complex organisms have unique reactions to identical 
6
stimuli.  Though two people just saw the same movie, one was moved to tears 
while the other felt nothing at all.  One bird flies away at the sight of a man while 
the other stays and watches.  Furthermore even in humans where we openly ac-
cept that others are conscious, the expression of comparable feelings can vary 
drastically between individuals.   A person can be happy and show it by laughing 
or crying.  Alternately, a person can be sad and react in the same way.   Some-
times people show no emotions at all though are experiencing strong feelings.   
Attributing mental states to other beings by looking at expression of emotions 
alone is troublesome because expressions of emotion may not be consistent.  This 
is enough of a problem with humans, but is even worse with animals for which 
there is no broad acceptance of any mental states at all.
As difficult as it is to interpret the mental states correlated with complex 
behaviors, it should be noted that even the mental states accompanying simple 
behaviors such as reflexes are easily misinterpreted.  For example, in response to 
being pinched, a woman automatically jerks her arm.  This reflex can occur via 
two separate neural pathways.  At a low threshold, one path can be activated that 
has a simple tactile feel without any accompanying pain.  If the pinch is strong 
enough, however, another pathway can be activated that conveys information 
about pain to the brain.  Two distinct mental states can be represented by a single 
behavior.  An outside observer could not possibly differentiate from the reflex 
alone whether the pinch resulted in the woman feeling pain or not.
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! In reality, people have little difficulty describing the mental states of other 
humans.  If a man is acting angry, it is generally assumed that he is angry.   Most 
of the time we are probably right.  Through various tests it might be found that his 
pulse and blood pressure are elevated, and that if his brain were scanned, it would 
reveal activity generally corresponding with the state of anger.  Such a combina-
tion of evidence may in most circumstances be entirely accurate for judging the 
emotional state of another person, but it is not definitive.  Behavior and physiol-
ogy appropriate to a given mental state are not proof of that mental state; they are 
only correlates.  
! The central problem is that a purely causal relationship between internal 
and necessarily subjective mental states and the concrete physical activities of a 
brain is not understood.  In other words, we may know what happens in the brain 
when we feel happy, but we do not know how this neural activity causes the feel-
ing of happiness.  How does the firing of neurons ultimately produce feelings and 
images that are "owned" by that organism?  What lends them their first-person 
quality?  This is known as the mind-body problem, and is a question that has long 
troubled philosophers (I will address it more fully in chapter three).  Without an 
understanding of how and why it is that feelings and consciousness arise, it is im-
possible to conclude anything about the mental states of another living organism, 
even whether they exist at all. 
This lack of knowledge concerning the nature of our selves and of feelings 
could pose a problem if people did not automatically make some basic assump-
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tions.  We cannot define what our minds or our feelings are.  Is the self an illu-
sion, a mere effect of neural activity?  We cannot say in which way we “exist.”  
Despite this, it is hard to argue that we don’t have a subjective mental state, re-
gardless of its true nature.  We accept that other humans have feelings and that 
they are comparable to our own.  There is more to reality than what we ourselves 
perceive; other people's perspectives also apply.  Society exists because we are 
satisfied with the correlative evidence around us and do not question its validity.  
That is, we do not require definitive proof that others possess consciousness, as it 
is ludicrous to assume otherwise.
Given these assumptions, it is easy to learn about the mental states of other 
humans.  It is not possible to know exactly what these mental states feel like, but 
this is not important so long as they correspond appropriately with our own (that 
is, sadness entails approximately the same behaviors in all individuals).  As de-
scribed earlier, most of the time we are very good at predicting what other humans 
are feeling, though sometimes we misread behavior and make mistakes.  Fortu-
nately, however, it is possible simply to ask the person to describe his or her men-
tal state.  While even this evidence provides no concrete proof, it is as definitive 
as possible, and far better than observation of behavior alone.
! Animals are not capable of complex communication in the sense that hu-
mans are.  It is therefore impossible to know the mental state of an animal like we 
can for another human.  Since we cannot ask how animals feel, and we do not 
even know if they do feel, we must try to infer this knowledge based on external 
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behavior and internal neural activity.  As described this is a difficult task necessar-
ily fraught with error and uncertainty.
! This thesis examines the topic of animal consciousness at the most basic 
level, not trying to ask what animals are feeling and thinking, rather whether they 
are thinking and feeling at all.  What can be said with certainty about animal con-
sciousness?   Must we abide by behaviorist thinking and remain agnostic as to the 
presence of a mental state?   Given the remarkable similarities between humans 
and animals, both in terms of behavior and biology, are basic judgments regarding 
consciousness well grounded?  At what point does it become a more intelligent 
generalization to assume that an animal has a mind rather than to be only a living 
machine?
Chapter 2: Defining Feelings and Consciousness
! Perhaps one reason why there is so much debate on the question of whether ani-
mals possess feelings stems from confusion about what is meant by the word itself.  Feel-
ings bring to mind many separate concepts, including emotional reactions, a general un-
derstanding of something, a tactile sensation, or even the immediate result of other types 
of perceptual stimulation (hearing, sight, etc).  Some uses of feeling are elusive and defy 
straightforward definition, like the feeling of being in love, or the feeling of a given color. 
Feelings can also be more simple, describing perceptions alone, as in the feeling of touch-
ing cold water, or burning a finger on the stove.  Conflating the various uses of the word 
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in regards to animal mental states is problematic because it potentially disregards the pos-
sibility that there is a continuous spectrum along which different organisms and individu-
als are capable of experiencing varying complexities of feelings.  If by feelings we mean 
that an animal can experience empathy and sadness, then it is possible that no animals in 
fact feels.  However, if by feelings we are claiming that animals have at least some sub-
jective mental states representing basic perceptions, the possibility that a broad range of 
animals may feel is more likely open.  A more precise definition of feelings is clearly 
needed to make progress on the topic.
! The definition of feelings that I use in this thesis places feelings as the most fun-
damental aspect of conscious experience; they are “irreducible on a mental plane” (Rus-
sell, 2003).  This definition is inclusive of all other uses of the word, and in fact can be 
considered the “primitive” that makes up more complex mental events like emotions 
(Russell, 2003).  In seeking to further refine this definition it is helpful to consider what 
their use may be.  Why have feelings at all?  What evolutionary advantage do they pro-
vide?  All feelings possess a subjective quality with an intrinsic value (Russell, 2003).  
This value can lie anywhere on a spectrum with two dimensions: activation-deactivation, 
as well as pleasure-displeasure (Russell, 2003).  Activation-deactivation (i.e. arousal) de-
scribes the intensity of the feeling, and can vary from sleep to drowsiness, alertness and 
excitement (Russell, 2003).  Pleasure-displeasure denotes the other subjective quality, 
namely to what extent a feeling is “good” or “bad”.  On one extreme lies agony, on the 
other, ecstasy (Russell, 2003).  At any given point, a feeling is an indicator of the condi-
tion of the organism that can be described in terms of these two spectrums (Russell, 2003; 
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Damasio, 2003).  Displeasurable feelings arise when an individual faces harm or potential 
harm, and pleasurable feelings arise with the arrival or anticipated arrival of something 
beneficial.  According to neurobiologist and philosopher Antonio Damasio, because feel-
ings have these subjective values, they serve as invaluable guides that help direct us to-
wards advantageous behavior (2003).  That is, we seek pleasurable feelings and avoid 
displeasurable ones.
! A further defining feature of all uses of the term feeling is that they are phenom-
ena of which we are consciously aware.  Consciousness is a requisite of feeling.  If a 
crayfish feels pain, for example, then it must be conscious.  Unfortunately, as described in 
the last chapter, it is impossible to prove that another organism can feel based upon its 
behavior alone (the trick is that it might merely behave in a manner that is roughly analo-
gous to behavior associated with pain in humans, without having any feeling at all).  
However, further analysis will allow us to show that the reverse of the above statement is 
also true.  Namely, the presence of consciousness implies that animals are also capable of 
feeling.  Therefore, even though we cannot know if the crayfish feels pain by observation 
alone, if we can establish that it is conscious we can be certain that it feels something 
which serves the same function as the feeling of pain we all experience.  Importantly, 
recognizing this allows the question of whether animals have feelings to instead be 
whether animals possess consciousness, a question which can be systematically ap-
proached by studying the brain’s biology.  As will be seen, however, this too is an ex-
tremely difficult task; presently the mechanisms responsible are not even understood in 
humans.
12
! Consciousness, like feeling, is a term that has no single widely accepted meaning 
and can represent many concepts depending upon the context.  Certainly humans are con-
scious in a way that is unique.  We are keenly aware of the state of our bodies, of our 
pasts and futures, of our thoughts and desires, and of the minds of others.  We have 
imaginative and creative abilities, and memories that can recall rich and detailed informa-
tion.  Human consciousness, however, should not be thought of as an irreducible mono-
lith (Damasio, 1999).  Like every other aspect of biology, it has reached its current re-
markable state through a slow evolution in which complexity has arisen as new adapta-
tions developed from preexisting structures.  For example, the eye is an immensely com-
plex structure that certainly did not arrive in one step; instead it started as a simple photo 
cell and evolved slowly to discriminate increasingly more information from the environ-
ment.  Similarly, it makes more sense to assume that consciousness arrived in stages 
rather than in a single moment at which point the brain had suddenly evolved sufficiently. 
When describing consciousness in other organisms we will inevitably need to do so in 
terms that relate to our own consciousness.  However, human consciousness should not 
be considered the starting point.  Rather, if other animals are conscious, it is likely that 
they would be so at a more simple and fundamental level.   It is likely that animal con-
sciousness is built of many of the necessary basic components that are elaborated and 
added to in human minds (Crick, 1998).
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DEFINING CONSCIOUSNESS
While little is known about the mechanics of consciousness, scientists and phi-
losophers have made progress in defining and conceptually understanding various aspects 
of what consciousness is.  A full review of this progress is beyond the scope of this work, 
however, I will outline some of the ideas as they relate to more fundamental aspects of 
consciousness possibly found in animals. 
There are many theories about how to subdivide and categorize consciousness 
into separate manageable concepts.  The most basic use of the word consciousness is the 
term “creature consciousness” (Clark, 1998).  This term describes an organism in its 
wakeful state (as opposed to being asleep or in coma) that is able to respond appropri-
ately to its environment.  Most vertebrates and many invertebrates including fish, reptiles, 
and amphibians possess creature consciousness.  It identifies such creatures as being 
alive.  Creature consciousness is a requisite state for all higher forms of consciousness, 
but is not very useful in identifying feelings in animals because it does not say anything 
about internal mental states.
A more useful distinction currently made regarding aspects of consciousness is 
the separation of explicit and implicit consciousness.  Explicit or phenomenal conscious-
ness is the experiential aspect of consciousness.  It is what allows for identity and self; 
without it there is no “me”, there is merely a functional organism without an owner.  Ex-
plicit consciousness is everything that we know about our selves, our senses, and the 
world around us.  It is everything of which we are aware, and importantly it is the con-
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nection of this information with “the idea of me”, as Russell puts it (2003).  Our explicit 
selves allow us to make decisions and to weigh options.  Our explicit selves constitute the 
“we” that knows about the body and can act in its best interest.  A more direct definition 
is difficult at this point because scientists still are unclear as to what explicit conscious-
ness is.  When looking for feelings in animals, we must look for the presence of explicit 
consciousness.  
Implicit consciousness refers to the functions of cognition that occur without 
awareness.  Though the behavior of a person who has implicit knowledge of something 
may be altered by that knowledge, this occurs without awareness.  No intentional choice 
is made.  Our implicit selves regulate our bodies, process and store information, and 
guide our behavior.  In fact, most of who “we” are is implicit; as Lewis explains “I have 
no knowledge of a large number of my motives- organized, coherent thoughts and ideas 
that have been called unconscious- that control large segments of my life.  I have no ex-
plicit knowledge of how my thoughts occur” (Lewis, 2003, p. 106).  We cannot be aware 
of all the information that our bodies process; it would be overwhelming to always feel 
what each part of our body was doing, focus on every memory that we possess, and think 
about each action we carry out.  An example of implicit consciousness would be when 
driving a car, our visual systems may process and act upon information without any 
awareness.  The presence of a car to the right, for example may go completely unnoticed, 
though we make sure to avoid running into it.  If someone directed our attention to the 
car, it could become the focus of our attention and enter explicit consciousness.  Implicit 
consciousness does not satisfy the general notion that to be conscious is to be aware.  To 
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be implicitly conscious is to have a brain that computes and allows one to be functional 
and react appropriately in the environment. 
Some scientists have emphasized the importance of implicit consciousness such 
that the role of explicit consciousness in cognition is drastically diminished  (Chalmers, 
1999; Block, 1995).  It is true that psychological studies of humans have demonstrated 
that a great number of our cognitive functions occur implicitly (Berridge, 2003).  Also, in 
addition to this “cognitive unconscious” there exists an “emotional unconscious”, where 
both the causes and effects of emotions remain outside of awareness (Berridge, 2003).  
The degree to which the implicit self contributes to overall behavior, though a subject of 
ongoing investigation, could indeed be significant.  Some even would say that implicit 
processes alone could feasibly drive any complex behavior, allowing for a so called 
“philosophical zombie”  (Chalmers, 1999).  In this case it could be true that animals op-
erate entirely implicitly, without any feeling self.   Regardless of how important the im-
plicit self may be, however, humans undeniably do have an explicit self.  This leaves 
open the possibility that other animals also possess explicit consciousness, which like in 
humans would play a coordinated role with the implicit self in behavior.
! Explicit consciousness, however, is itself a complex concept that can be separated 
into more fundamental components.  As mentioned earlier, consciousness is not an irre-
ducible monolith.  We have many different types of consciousness, including forms that 
are associated with vision, pain, hearing, self-consciousness, and so on (Crick, 1998).  
These forms can function independently, such that loss of one does not affect the per-
formance of another.  With damage to the visual cortex, for example, a person may lose 
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the ability to form mental visual images, yet retain other forms of consciousness.  Al-
though there is definite separation between different forms of consciousness, the underly-
ing mechanisms for each system likely function identically (Crick, 1998), and further-
more all forms at some level probably share some structural features (Damasio, 1999).   It 
is therefore possible to describe the workings of any one system and apply this knowl-
edge to all other forms of consciousness.
! Each form of consciousness can be further divided into various levels correspond-
ing with different complexities and layers of awareness.  There is no clear division be-
tween these forms of consciousness; more likely awareness increases in complexity and 
intensity gradually with increased mental capacity.  The existence of a primary conscious 
state requisite to all higher forms of consciousness has been theorized independently in 
the disciplines of biology, psychology, and philosophy.  This concept has been labeled in 
various ways, including core consciousness, bare awareness, and primary-process con-
sciousness, though all are essentially identical (Damasio, 1999; Johnson-Laird, 1988; 
Panksepp, 2005).   The most basic aspect of core conscious experience is feeling, or “raw 
sensory-perceptual feelings” (Panksepp, 2005).  It is the most fundamental level of con-
sciousness; it can be thought of as the “light” that turns on and differentiates an individ-
ual capable of experience and “knowing” from a mindless organism that merely reacts.  
Core consciousness is “the very evidence, the unvarnished sense of our organism in the 
act of knowing” (Damasio, 1999, p. 125).  The act of knowing is itself a feeling; therefore 
to be core conscious is by definition also to feel (Damasio, 1999).  
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! As the most basic level of consciousness, it follows core consciousness would be 
the most widely distributed level of awareness among animals.  The precise mechanisms 
responsible for core consciousness are not known, however, so it is impossible to say 
when it first evolved.  Perhaps it is a structure that originated in distant ancestors com-
mon to many animals.   It could also be a capability unique to mammals, primates, or 
even alone the human brain.  This problem will be addressed in the following chapter 
along with a discussion of the neural structures necessary for core consciousness.
! Building upon the basic awareness of core consciousness is secondary conscious-
ness, a concept that describes the ability to make thoughts about experiences, usually in 
reference to how external events relate to internal events (Panksepp, 2005).  That is, with 
secondary consciousness, one reflects on sensations not with words or other symbols, but 
with “perceptual images” (Panksepp, 2005).  Imagine non-verbally recognizing the pain 
of a cut thumb. 
! The human mind is capable of the most advanced level of consciousness, called 
tertiary consciousness.  Tertiary consciousness is a sort of meta-consciousness; the ability  
to have thoughts about thoughts.  Specifically, it requires the ability to make linguistic 
and other forms of symbolic representations of simple thoughts and memories.  It is 
widely accepted that no animals are capable of tertiary consciousness, with the possible 
exception of perhaps some great apes (Panksepp, 2005).  
! In this study it is necessary to establish what actual evidence supports the exis-
tence of core consciousness.  Is core consciousness a biological state that can be physi-
cally distinguished from higher forms of consciousness, or is it merely a theoretical con-
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struct that is useful in describing the mind?   Damasio believes it can in fact be distin-
guished biologically. He bases this claim upon years of clinical work, a route not com-
monly taken in consciousness studies (Crick, 1990).  Damasio’s basic hypothesis states 
that core consciousness can exist alone, but when coupled with additional cognitive func-
tions also allows for higher forms of consciousness, which fall under the umbrella term 
“extended consciousness” (1999).  Importantly, when core consciousness is impaired 
through brain damage, extended consciousness is also lost (Damasio, 1999) (when core 
consciousness is impaired, the person enters a vegetative state).  When extended con-
sciousness is impaired, however, core consciousness can remain intact.  Additionally, it 
seems the same mechanisms (structures) of core consciousness are required for every 
type of sensory awareness.  That is, it is possible to lose consciousness in a sensory mo-
dality through damage to the cortex without losing core consciousness, though damaging 
any of the select structures necessary for core consciousness impairs all consciousness 
entirely.  I will address which structures these are in the next chapter.
! According to Damasio, an important aspect of core consciousness is that the brain 
creates representations in the mind that have the quality of being owned by the organism 
making them.  This inner sense, he claims, is based upon mental images of a feeling that 
describes the relationship of an object and the organism.  Namely, these images describe 
how the state of the organism is changed, moment by moment, by the object.  A con-
scious state arises through the process of the neural mapping of the body state, the object 
(which come from sensory perceptions), and the mapping of their subsequent relation-
ship.  He again comes back to the feeling-grounded nature of consciousness by asserting 
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that because of the “body-related nature” of these maps, the consequent mental images 
that arise are feelings (Damasio, 1999, p. 170).
! It seems unlikely that a person may exist who is only capable of core conscious-
ness, but Damasio describes one patient, David, who comes close to such a description.  
David suffered severe damage to several regions of his brain necessary for creating new 
memories as well as accessing past memories; he was the most severely amnesic patient 
ever recorded (1999).  His perception of the world exists entirely in the moment; there is 
only a vague sense of the past, and absolutely no sense for a future upon which to relate 
current experiences.  David lacks what is known as an “autobiographical self.”  However, 
David is not a zombie- from his behavior it is evident that he forms images in his mind 
from all sensory modalities, and that these images have the quality of being owned by 
him.  He is aware, capable of sustained attention, and able to experiences all primary 
emotions; “in terms of core consciousness, David is as conscious as you or I” (Damasio, 
1999, p. 118).  In fact he is capable of speech, can make simple comments about his sur-
roundings, expresses basic likes and dislikes, and can even play checkers (he can’t name 
the game or explain the rules).  Though David’s extended consciousness is not entirely 
lost, as is evident by his ability to use language, etc., his mental life probably consists of 
little more than a purely core conscious state.  His unique case illustrates how the basic 
structures required for feeling and consciousness are independent from the additional 
cognitive activities that consummate a normal mind.
! It can be difficult to comprehend what core consciousness “feels like” because 
humans have highly developed conscious states that can represent things simultaneously 
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on many levels.  There are times, however, when it is easily recognized.   Take the exam-
ple of the cut finger.  While the pain may be re-represented in higher forms of conscious-
ness and further elaborated and manipulated by memories of similar feelings, these 
higher-order mental processes are separate from core consciousness.  Alone the aching 
feeling of pain constitutes core consciousness.  Similarly, when looking at a face it is the 
visual information alone that constitutes core consciousness, not the accompanying affec-
tive feelings that might arise from recognizing the person as a friend or as a source of 
danger.
! Core consciousness includes the notion of feeling and a sense of self.  It does not 
include what Damasio calls the “autobiographical self” (1999).  That is, it is does not in-
clude all the aspects of self that are made available with the addition of memory, reason-
ing, and other higher cognitive functions.  These in conjunction with core consciousness 
contribute to extended consciousness, a concept which also encompasses all the varia-
tions on secondary and tertiary consciousness (Damasio, 1999).   Certainly the ability of 
an organism to focus on an object increases with extended consciousness, as may the in-
tensity and meaning of feelings experienced as they are related to memories of previously 
experienced feelings.  The sense of self that is generated by core consciousness, however, 
alone is enough to make an individual.  An organism capable of core consciousness can 
know pain and pleasure, feel tired or awake, and everything in between, even if only tran-
siently.  When questioning whether animals are individuals capable of feeling, establish-
ing the presence of core consciousness is sufficient.  From this starting point, more inves-
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tigation can then be made to discern what additional functions the animal might have that 
could contribute to a richer extended consciousness.
! The following section is devoted to the physical aspects of the problem of con-
sciousness, specifically as they relate to what little is known of core consciousness.  With 
a knowledge of the physical features necessary for core consciousness in humans, we will 
be able to look at other animals, and given the presence of analogous structures, be able 
to infer in them the presence of core consciousness and feelings. 
Chapter 3- The Biology of Core Consciousness
To attain proof as to the existence or absence of feelings and core consciousness in ani-
mals, it is not enough to observe behavior and neural activity alone; the biology of con-
sciousness must be understood.  This, however, must first be established in humans, a 
problem as difficult as any in biology (Chalmers, 1999).  Until the early 1990’s, con-
sciousness had been almost entirely ignored by biologists and neuropsychologists, con-
sidered a subject not worth scientific study (Horgan, 1999; Watt, 2004a).  Through their 
seminal paper “Towards a neurobiological theory of consciousness,” Francis Crick and 
Christoph Koch helped make consciousness an area of active research by arguing suc-
cessfully that progress on the problem is possible through an intelligent approach (Hor-
gan, 1994).  While there have since then been advances in theoretically conceptualizing 
what consciousness is, the underlying biology remains as elusive as ever. 
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! There are myriad difficulties associated with the study of consciousness in hu-
mans.  The most fundamental problem is that experiential states by nature cannot be stud-
ied as can other problems in science (MacLennan, 1995).  All other biological processes 
can be observed and objectively measured, but because of their personal and internal na-
ture, mental states cannot.  The only evidence of mental states available are verbal reports 
and behavior.  By necessity, the study of consciousness is subjective and indirect.
! This fundamental problem limits our ability to study exactly what experience is 
from a  physical perspective.  The best that we can do is observe the brain during a given 
mental state and record patterns of activity.  This, however, is difficult because it is im-
possible to induce experiential states directly; instead, indirect methods must be utilized 
such as exposure to stimuli or having a subject concentrate on a given feeling or memory 
(Cleeremans, 1999).  This presents two major problems when looking for neural corre-
lates of consciousness.  First, there is much uncertainty as to the actual state a subject is 
experiencing after such inductions.  Second, when observing a brain supposedly in a 
happy state, for example, many processes not directly involved in the conscious aware-
ness of happiness will also be highlighted, since the brain is always simultaneously en-
gaged in multiple parallel activities, and these must be carefully teased apart from the es-
sential correlates (Cleeremans, 1999).
  ! Philosopher David Chalmers has framed the study of consciousness as consisting 
of numerous “easy” problems and of one “hard” problem (Chalmers, 1999).  The easy 
problems, he claims, are not in fact easy, but rather labeled easy because they are foresee-
ably worked out using conventional reductionistic scientific method.  These problems all 
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deal with “objective mechanisms of the cognitive system,” and can be solved by uncover-
ing how these mechanisms operate  (Chalmers, 1999, p. 289).  This includes questions 
such as: how does the brain discriminate between sensory stimuli, and how does it use 
this information appropriately? (Chalmers, 1999).   How is the brain able to verbalize in-
ternal states?  What are the processes that lead to behavior, and to what extent are these 
controlled implicitly versus explicitly?  How are perceptions from various sensory sys-
tems blended into a coherent understanding of a single object (this is known as the “bind-
ing problem”)?  What are the neural correlates of consciousness?  What structures and 
processes are needed to produce experience?
! The hard problem, by contrast, cannot be studied by conventional means.  Also 
called the “explanatory gap” and the “mind-body problem,” it is unlike any other ques-
tion in science.  Why should patterns of activity in the brain lead to experiences?  How 
can subjective qualities (qualia) be explained in physical terms?  How could one possibly 
describe how warmth feels or what a shade of blue looks like in terms of the firing of 
neurons?  Chalmers does not refute the notion that consciousness arises from processes in 
the brain, he simply states that the link between experience and the physical world is not 
one which can be explained by any set of laws currently known.  
! There is a large and diverse group of philosophers and scientists dubbed “the new 
mysterians,” who for various reasons believe that the mind-body problem is insoluble 
(Horgan, 1999).  Mysterians claim that mental states cannot be fully explained in terms of 
physical properties alone (Horgan, 1999).  Some claim that the problem is related to 
quantum mechanics, which creates “nondeterministic effects that classical theories of 
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physics (and neuroscience) cannot” (Horgan, 1999, p. 300).   Other philosophers argue 
that the while the problem of consciousness is technically soluble, human intelligence is 
not developed enough to comprehend it (Glynn, 1999).  Chalmers remains agnostic on 
the issue, though has suggested the need for a new set of fundamental laws which relate 
“experience to elements of physical theory” (Chalmers, 1999, p. 292).   According to his 
thinking, the concept of information might be the link that can bridge the explanatory 
gap.  Information can be thought of as a “set of separate states with a basic structure of 
similarities and differences between them” ( Chalmers, 1999, p. 294).  Everything in the 
physical world can be described as an information state, and so can conscious experience. 
He suggests that a single information state may describe both the physical and experien-
tial aspect of something.  Therefore experience is an intrinsic quality not to be explained 
by mechanisms, but rather that exists independently.
! Whether soluble or insoluble, the mind-body problem will likely continue to con-
cern philosophers into the foreseeable future.  While the attention the mind-body problem 
receives from philosophers is valuable, some point out that there are perhaps more pro-
ductive areas of study upon which to focus.  Crick and Koch claim that endlessly arguing 
over the solubility of the problem gets us nowhere, and in fact inhibits progress in other 
areas (1990).  They admit that to gain a full picture of consciousness, the mind-body 
problem must be understood.   However, this understanding, if at all attainable, will only 
come after further studies of neural mechanisms.  Once the neural mechanisms of con-
sciousness are understood (that is, the easy problems), we will be in a far better position 
to approach the hard question.
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! Although the mysterians are correct that the true nature of consciousness may 
never be discovered, science can still arguably give great insight into the problem.  In my 
view, understanding what processes give rise to mental states is more important than un-
derstanding why mental states arise from these processes.  It is conceivable that through 
future research we may discover precisely the structures, even the specific cells, in the 
brain necessary for any given aspect of consciousness, and further we may learn what 
physical processes take place neural activity.  We may also learn how a unified sense of 
self arises given the fact there exists no single place, or “Cartesian Theater” (Dennet, 
2003), from which consciousness arises.  Even without answering the hard question, un-
derstanding the neural correlates of consciousness should reveal much about what experi-
ence is, and will give insight into the nature of our own existence.  Furthermore, only 
with this knowledge will we have the tools necessary to make any conclusions regarding 
the minds of non-human animals.  The existence in animals of neural systems analogous 
to those which produce core consciousness in humans would prove that such animals are 
capable of feeling.
! There is, however, little agreement currently about what processes are necessary 
for core consciousness (Cleeremans, 1999).  Various theories exist but none is yet satis-
factory (Chalmers, 1999).  This is due both to the tremendous difficulty of the study and 
also to the relatively short time that it has received attention.  Chalmers has compiled a 
list of 20 such theories representing many diverse ideas (1998).  One theory introduced 
by Crick and Koch states that synchronized oscillations in various regions of the brain at 
a high frequency range between 40 and 150 Hz might “underlie feature integration” and 
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be the substrate for core conscious awareness (Rees, 2002).  They support this notion by 
noting that certain cognitive functions thought to be closely related to awareness can alter 
the overall patterns of synchronized neural activity (Rees, 2002).  A vastly different view 
on consciousness is that awareness originates not from entire brain systems, but in fact 
from individual neurons (Sevush, 2005).  According to this view, the electrical activity of 
the dendritic portion of neuron determines the content of its consciousness.   The more 
complex the activity, the more complex the content of the conscious experience.  An or-
ganism’s overall conscious experience is the result of interactions from all neurons in the 
brain, with some regions being more important than others (Sevush, 2005).  Interestingly 
this view would support the notion that animals possess feelings.
! Other ideas are grounded upon varying degrees of evidence and offer at best plau-
sible explanations for overall patterns of neural behavior.  It should be noted that none, 
however, address the mind-body problem; experience is simply an emergent property that 
results from neural activity (Chalmers, 1999).  This is true of the single neuron hypothe-
sis, where experience simply occurs in the dendrites.  There is no explanation of how or 
why; indeed the author claims that the evidence does not necessitate the conclusion, only 
that it fits with it (if only very loosely) (Sevush, 2005).  The oscillatory theory, which 
notes that such synchronous firing often occurs when one is aware, also does not address 
the mind-body problem.  It is not claimed that the oscillations cause awareness, or that 
they are even sufficient for awareness.  In fact, there is no hard evidence that says what 
their true significance is; at best pure speculation is possible.  Regardless, the aim of 
these theorists at present is not to solve the mind-body problem but to isolate the proc-
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esses and mechanisms requisite for awareness.  There is clearly much still to be done in 
this pursuit.
! Precisely identifying the neural correlates of core consciousness, i.e. the mecha-
nisms by which various structures interact, in humans is necessary in order to definitively 
assess whether animals are capable of core consciousness.  As this has not been accom-
plished, such an assessment is currently not possible.  A more immediately achievable 
goal is to identify the basic structures that correlate with various aspects of conscious-
ness, specifically those that are responsible for core consciousness.  Although not defini-
tive, the presence of equivalent structures in other animals would strongly support the 
notion that they too are capable of feeling.
! What research has been done regarding where in the brain consciousness occurs?  
This question has received more attention than any other regarding the neural correlates 
of consciousness, yet remains largely unanswered.  One major point under scrutiny is to 
what extent the neocortex plays a role in creating consciousness compared to other parts 
of the brain.  The neocortex is the evolutionarily newest part of the brain found only in 
mammals, and is presumed by many to be the structure responsible for producing con-
sciousness in humans (Panksepp, 2004; Watt, 2004b).   It is involved in many higher 
cognitive functions including motor commands, sensory perception, spatial reasoning, 
and language (Kelly, 1991).  Physically, the neocortex accounts for about 80% of the hu-
man brain’s mass, is situated at the outermost section of the brain, and consists of six lay-
ers that fold into numerous sulci (grooves) and gyri (wrinkles) (Kelly, 1991).
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! The notion that conscious awareness (analogous to core consciousness) occurs 
principally in the neocortex has been supported by the work of Christoph Koch’s group 
(Rees, 2002).  He has identified various structures that are needed to produce specific as-
pects of visual awareness.  Importantly, damage to ventral visual cortical areas that are 
responsive to specific aspects of the visual environment cause corresponding impairment 
of those aspects of consciousness (Rees, 2002).  For example, damage to the motor cor-
tex, V5/MT, which responds to visual movement, leads to the condition known as akine-
topsia, in which moving objects cannot be perceived (Rees, 2002).  Damage to ventral 
areas of the occipitotemporal cortex, which are sensitive to specific colors, can cause 
achromatopsia, the inability to perceive colors (Rees, 2002).  Work by Erik Lumer sug-
gests that the parietal and prefrontal cortices (found in the neocortex) also play an impor-
tant role in visual awareness, specifically in transitioning attention between precepts 
(1998).  From this data, Rees has suggested that these two cortices, in addition to the ven-
tral visual cortices, comprise the necessary neural substrates of visual core consciousness 
(2002).  The general notion is that core awareness for other sensory modalities is pro-
duced analogously with the prefrontal, parietal, and respective sensory cortices in the 
neocortex.
! It is important to understand that while the above does pinpoint certain structures 
needed for given aspects of consciousness, the data do not necessitate the conclusion that 
consciousness is produced in those regions.  Perhaps these structures are merely part of a 
chain of components that allow for our conscious perceptions of the world.  Certainly 
these areas are needed to compute and organize aspects of the environment into useful 
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and recognizable forms.  It is possible, however, that they function more as a lens that 
brings various aspects of consciousness into focus, rather than comprising the entire 
mechanism necessary for experience.  Might consciousness occur in lower brain struc-
tures even if it is dependent upon processes from the neocortex?
! Antonio Damasio offers a different interpretation from Rees based upon his own 
research and understanding of what core consciousness is.  As explained in chapter two, 
Damasio hypothesizes that core consciousness emerges in second-order neural maps that 
relate current mappings of the condition of the organism to maps that describe an object 
at any moment.  In other words, core consciousness stems from the process of continu-
ously describing in the form of neural mappings, how the body is affected by an object.  
From this hypothesis, it follows that only the three types of structures corresponding with 
these mappings are required to produce core consciousness: those of the organism, those 
of the object, and those that relate the two.  The structures involved in mapping the or-
ganism’s body state (which Damasio calls the proto-self) are dispersed throughout the 
brain, within a few parts of the neocortex as well as many evolutionarily older sub-
neocortical regions.  Included are several brain-stem nuclei, which, in addition to regulat-
ing the body, are the first point at which the overall state of the organism is mapped.  The 
hypothalamus, a structure in the forebrain (below the cortex), also contains a map of the 
body state and maintains homeostasis by regulating pH and levels of circulating chemi-
cals such as glucose.  Finally, regions of the neocortex also contribute to the proto-self, 
including the insula, the S2, and the medial parietal cortices.  These regions seem to pro-
vide the most integrated overall mapping of the body (Damasio, 1999).
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! The maps that comprise the proto-self are combined with mappings of an object 
(from early sensory cortices) in structures containing second-order maps.  Structures 
thought to contain second-order maps include the superior colliculi located in the mid-
brain, the entire cingulate cortex (which is below the neocortex), the thalamus, and finally 
some prefrontal cortices in the neocortex.  Damasio hypothesizes that these second-order 
structures cooperate to varying degrees in producing consciousness.  Most likely complex 
cross-signaling patterns among many structures are needed to produce consciousness, 
rather than there being any one structure that alone holds the “supreme second-order pat-
tern” (Damasio, 1999, p. 177).  He recommends that future research focus on discovering 
exactly what role each region plays and in what precise manner they interact (1999).
! It should be noted that Damasio’s hypothesis is consistent with results that led 
Rees and others to conclude that consciousness is produced in the neocortex.  Core con-
sciousness can be activated when any sensory input reaches the second-order maps.  
Therefore, the fact that damage to specific sensory structures impairs consciousness in 
those modalities is not surprising.  Koch has not located neural correlates of conscious-
ness, rather sensory structures whose direct input is needed to produce core conscious-
ness in secondary structures.
! Jaak Panksepp also hypothesizes that core consciousness is grounded upon a cur-
rent mapping of the body and not simply the external world interpreted in sensory struc-
tures, as claims Rees and others.  Additionally, however, he argues that the neocortex 
does not contribute directly to this process.  In fact, he claims that all of the basic mecha-
nisms are located in sub-neocortical structures common to all mammals and many other 
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animals including birds.  The neocortex is responsible for higher forms of consciousness 
(secondary, tertiary, extended), our introspective abilities, and our unique cognitive ca-
pacities (Panksepp, 2005).
! Panksepp bases this inference on a diverse groundwork of reasoning and evi-
dence.  Importantly, it has been demonstrated that when the brain is cognitively active 
(i.e. the cortex is active), affect is reduced, while with more intense feelings of emotion 
and affect, subcortical regions are predominantly activated (Panksepp, 2005).  This piece 
of evidence in particular does not prove that core consciousness is produced in subcorti-
cal areas, just as the activation of the visual system does not prove that it is produced in 
the neocortex.  However, it has also been proven through a variety of clinical cases that 
almost all structures necessary for consciousness are subcortical; most illnesses in which 
consciousness is impaired are due to damage to subcortical regions (Watt, 2004b).  Fur-
thermore, though the neocortex is necessary in a functioning adult mind, subcortical re-
gions alone are sufficient to produce core consciousness and affect before the brain fully 
develops.  Children with damage to large portions of their neocortices at birth are con-
scious and develop functioning emotions, even though comparable damage to adults 
would result in a persistent vegetative state (Panksepp, 2005).  In combination, this evi-
dence supports the concept that subcortical regions are primarily responsible for core 
consciousness, while neocortical regions facilitate extended consciousness.  
! From a logical perspective, Panksepp finds it hard to fathom that the information 
needed for core experiential states present in subcortical regions require the higher cogni-
tive abilities of the neocortex to be “read-out” into conscious states (2005).  That con-
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sciousness emerges gradually, beginning from simple levels rather than all at once as the 
result of complex cognition, seems logical given the evidence pointing to the importance 
of subcortical systems in consciousness.   This idea also makes more sense evolutionarily, 
since the most parsimonious explanation for the development of consciousness is that it 
developed gradually, beginning by representing the basic condition of the body through 
core consciousness in the subcortical regions, to eventually allowing an organism to cog-
nitively reflect on thoughts and have an understanding of the past and future through de-
velopment of the neocortex. 
! If Panksepp is correct claiming that core consciousness occurs sub-neocortically 
in humans, then there is a strong argument that many animals are capable of core con-
sciousness.  The subcortical regions he deems necessary are not only present in many ver-
tebrates, including all mammals, but have diverged little among classes of animals (Pank-
sepp, 2005).  In fact this would include all vertebrates, including mammals, birds, rep-
tiles, and fish.  It would not include any invertebrate animals such as insects or crusta-
ceans.  Without knowing the exact processes that contribute to consciousness, we cannot 
be certain that these regions are performing the exact same functions, but the evidence 
would regardless overwhelmingly support the conclusion.  
! If Panksepp is wrong, however, if consciousness is dependent upon higher neo-
cortical processes, then there is still a strong argument that at least all mammals, which 
also posses a neocortex, are capable of core consciousness.  Admittedly, the neocortex is 
far more developed in humans than in all other mammals, but there is no evidence for 
anything fundamentally different that might allow for consciousness to occur in humans 
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alone (Panksepp, 2005).  Additionally, it is possible that core consciousness is dependent 
upon neocortical activities in humans while in other animals it is not, since humans are 
capable of core consciousness even when the neocortex is damaged.   Perhaps core con-
sciousness originally evolved without the few neocortical structures demonstrated by 
Damasio to be necessary for core consciousness in normal adult humans.  Maybe as hu-
man consciousness developed other structures were integrated in order to accommodate 
and enhance the growing cognitive abilities.  There is only a strong argument against 
animals being conscious if one assumes that the concept of a core conscious state is 
flawed.  That is, if consciousness only emerges as a result of higher cognitive abilities as 
some claim, (Rolls, 1999; LeDoux, 1996) then no other species, with the possible excep-
tion of other primates, can be conscious.  This notion, however, is most likely flawed 
(Damasio, 1999; Watt, 2004b; Panksepp, 2005); consciousness is a multi-tiered process 
dependent upon structures widely evolutionarily conserved among animals. 
Chapter 4- Conclusions/Implications
 The question of animal feelings has a wide range of important implications.  If it 
can be proven that animals are conscious, our interactions with other species will be 
given new and greater meaning.  We are far more likely to relate to and respect an animal 
that is conscious and feeling like a human than one that is unfeeling and mindless.  While 
this may not affect our relationships with our pets, which we may already consider to be 
feeling, it could alter the way many humans interact with animals in nature.  Currently, 
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there seems to be a widespread mentality in which sacrificing the natural environment for 
human needs is deemed acceptable.  Even natural areas kept off limits to development are 
often saved for the benefit of humans; a forest may be saved for its beauty, for example, 
rather than preserving it in consideration of nature itself.  This is a perfectly valid mental-
ity if we do not consider other species to have any identity of their own.  If it was known 
that animals had feelings, however, there may be more incentive to treat nature in a more 
respectable way.  Just as humans feel obligated to treat other humans in a decent manner, 
perhaps we would also treat other animals and their habitats with renewed respect and 
compassion.
! From a more practical standpoint, Jaak Panksepp (2005) argues that by making 
the assumption that animals are core conscious, valuable insights into understanding the 
human mind can be made, especially with regard to the systems underlying emotion and 
attention.  Understanding the biology of these phenomena in humans is currently re-
stricted to observing neural correlates, i.e., recording which parts of the brain are active 
during a given state.  Panksepp points out that mammals display emotional behavior that 
is strikingly similar to that of humans.  Furthermore, animals can be studied far more di-
rectly then can humans; slight changes to physiology produce effects on emotional or at-
tentional behavior that can be measured, as can the direct effects that changes in behavior 
have on neurons in the brain.  If we accept that the behavior of mammals actually reflects 
internal states like our own, the potential for studying the underlying mechanisms behind 
our own feelings and emotions may be greatly increased by studying those of mammals 
(Panksepp, 2005).
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! The formal study of animal feelings has until recently been essentially neglected 
in modern science.  This neglect is a result of the difficulty associated with studying men-
tal processes, which is enormous in humans and even more formidable in other animals 
because we cannot confirm findings with verbal descriptions of mental state.  Neuro-
biologists have spent much of the past century simply trying to grapple with the basic 
structure and function of the human brain; mapping its complex architecture, understand-
ing how neurons function, slowly discovering how sensory systems represent the outside 
world, and so on.  The field has been far from able to even approach uncovering the bio-
logical basis of feelings.  Furthermore, psychology ignored the content of the mind for 
much of the 20th century due to the influence of behaviorism, which advocated studying 
only observable behaviors.  Only since the early 1990’s have psychology and biology 
come together to formally study human consciousness and the nature of the mind.  The 
advances made since then also allow animal feelings to be approached for the first time, 
though both fields remain in their infancy.
! One major difficulty in trying to study animal feelings is that it is not entirely 
clear what feelings are.  We do know what feelings are for, namely that they serve as a 
means of guiding an organism to appropriate behavior (Damasio, 2003), but beyond this, 
there is little agreement about exact definitions.  The view taken in this thesis is that feel-
ings are the experience that arises through the processes of core consciousness, the most 
basic level of awareness.  Put in another way, feelings are the fundamental content of 
consciousness.  One cannot have consciousness without also feeling, and one cannot feel 
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without being conscious.  Therefore, when trying to decide whether animals have feel-
ings, it is appropriate to instead ask whether animals are capable of core consciousness.
! How might it be possible to determine whether or not an animal is core con-
scious?  Trying to analyze the content of a mind is exceedingly difficult because unlike 
everything else in science, experience cannot be observed and measured (MacLennan, 
1995).  We cannot look at a brain and see experiences, we cannot know from the outside 
what or even if an organism has a mental life.  From our own experience we know that 
certain behaviors correlate very well with various feelings, and we depend upon this for 
our daily interactions with each other.  When animals behave in comparable ways, it is 
easily assumed that they too have a corresponding experience.  This is especially true re-
garding mammals, our closest relatives.  It is difficult to observe any mammal, whether a 
dog, a squirrel, or an otter, and imagine that the creature has no experience accompanying 
its behaviors, which are so reminiscent of our own.  As described in Chapter One, how-
ever, behavior alone is not a reliable indicator of a mental state because any given behav-
ior may have various alternative causes, some of which may not involve any conscious-
ness at all.  Unfortunately, unlike with humans, we cannot verify our interpretations of 
mental states with a verbal report.  Therefore many scientists from the behaviorist school 
would rightly argue that it is wrong to infer mental states in animals.
! Despite this uncertainty, however, as discussed in chapter one, many animals un-
doubtedly do seem to have mental lives.  It seems fair to push the question further; if we 
cannot verify mental states by behavior alone, might revealing the presence in animals of 
neural structures known to produce experience in humans suffice?  If in addition to acting 
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in ways analogous to humans, animals also have similar brain structures and undergo 
similar neurophysiological changes, the weight of evidence would strongly support the 
notion that animals also are capable of feeling and experience.
! Currently, the biological processes underlying consciousness remain almost en-
tirely unknown.  Various hypotheses attempt to explain overall patterns of behavior seen 
in the brain that seem to correlate well with conscious experience.  As there is no real 
idea of what the physical correlates of consciousness should be, however, it is difficult to 
comprehend the true importance of these patterns of activity.  Much careful research is 
necessary in this pursuit.
! A more practical area of research involves simply locating the structures neces-
sary to produce core consciousness.  One of the most contested issues is whether these 
exist primarily in the neocortex, which is unique to mammals and largest in humans, or in 
subcortical regions more widely evolutionarily conserved.  Arguments favoring the role 
of the neocortex are grounded on research done on the visual system indicating that cer-
tain regions show patterns of activity which correlate well with conscious experience 
(Rees, 2002).  This logic presumes that there exist many structurally independent types of 
consciousness.  Others would argue that while the neocortex is involved in awareness and 
cognition, it does not participate directly in producing consciousness; rather subcortical 
structures carry out this function (Damasio, 1995; Panksepp, 2005; Watt, 2004b).  This 
implies that although there may be many structurally independent facets of consciousness 
corresponding with different modalities existing in the neocortex, all forms stem from a 
unified group of neural structures.  This conclusion is based upon many observations, in-
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cluding the fact that most disorders that involve impaired consciousness are due to le-
sions of subcortical structures (Watt, 2004b) and that consciousness can exist to some ex-
tent without the neocortex (Panksepp, 2005).  Importantly, Antonio Damasio has outlined 
a testable hypothesis for how consciousness might come about which predicts primarily 
the participation of certain subcortical structures (1999).  Though the issue is by no 
means resolved, arguments favoring the importance of subcortical regions in producing 
consciousness are, in my opinion, stronger than those supporting the importance of the 
neocortex alone.
! In order to make any inferences about whether or not other animals are capable of 
feeling, we must be able to show that they possess neural systems capable of producing 
core consciousness.  The underlying logic is that if animals possess structures analogous 
to those responsible for consciousness in humans then they too are conscious.  If the ex-
act structures required in humans were known, we could make confident inferences about 
the presence of feelings in other animals.  Unfortunately, at this point it is not known 
what these precise structures are, though as discussed, we may soon be able to recognize 
general regions in the human brain which contain the precise structures.  Therefore we 
can at present at least make tentative inferences about animal minds.  
! What these inferences might be depends upon whether consciousness is a rela-
tively recent adaptation that requires the participation of newer neocortical systems, or if 
it is an evolutionarily older ability inherent to the widely conserved subcortical regions.  
If consciousness requires the participation of the neocortex, then it is probable that all 
mammals are core conscious, as they possess neocortices not fundamentally different 
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from our own (Panksepp, 2005).  If, like Panksepp suggests, only subcortical structures 
are required, then a far larger number of animals that share subcortical structures very 
similar to our own could be included, namely all birds, fish, and reptiles (2005).  Inverte-
brates such as insects or crustaceans do not possess even rudimentary forms of vertebrate 
subcortical regions.  This does not mean that they necessarily lack core consciousness, 
only that we have no way of guessing based upon general similarity of structure.
! While the presence of these regions in other animals would strongly suggest that 
they too are capable of core consciousness, it is flawed to assume that this is proof.  We 
can say with the greatest confidence that other mammals are core conscious because they 
possess the probable requisite structures according to all views on consciousness.  It 
could be, however, that even though other mammals also posses neocortices, they do not 
have the same function; perhaps only the human neocortex can produce consciousness.  
The same is true regarding subcortical structures.  Put another way, even though other 
animals may possess the general regions necessary for consciousness in humans, perhaps 
they lack some additional adaptation within these structures that has not yet been recog-
nized.  Currently, all statements about the neurobiology of animal consciousness are 
based on evidence citing general analogies of structure and must therefore take these 
limitations into account.  Only when the precise neural structure necessary for conscious-
ness in humans are determined will it be possible to identify with certainty which, if any, 
other animals are core conscious.  In the mean time, behavioral and neurobiological evi-
dence strongly suggests that at least mammals are core conscious, if not all other verte-
brates as well.
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